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1 Introduction
Access to credit has been a major instrument in the
promotion of equitable growth and the reduction
of poverty in Indonesia. There are two major insti-
tutional providers of financial services in rural
areas: the government-owned Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI) with some 3,500 sub-branches
(unit or unit desa) at sub-district level, and some
9,000 formal and semi-formal MFIs. Growth in the
number of village banks and rural branches, as a
consequence of the deregulation of the banking
sector in 1988, helped increase the supply of finan-
cial services to the lower segments of the rural pop-
ulation. This deregulation also increased
competition and, together, the BRI and the MFIs
now have a total of 23.8 million accounts which
consist of 4.71 million loan accounts and 19.08
million savings deposit accounts (Table 1). All the
same, BRI outperforms the MRs by a considerable
margin: 16.75 million micro-finance accounts in
BRI vs. 7.10 million accounts in various MFIs. The
micro-finance sector in Indonesia is characterised
by an extraordinary variety of institutions. Different
types of MFIs are summarised in Box 1. A remark-
able feature of the micro-finance sector is its self-
financing capacity Together, BRI and MFIs fully
finance their lending operations from internal
resources, though BRI more so than the local MFIs.
The article presents a case study of the BPR Bank
Shinta Daya, a self-financed private village bank
established in 1970 in DI. Yogakarta on Java. In
the past it dealt mainly with individual clients but,
inspired by Bank Indonesia's linkage banking pro-
gramme, has also adopted the group lending
approach. Bank Shinta Daya presents an outstand-
ing example of a private institution that is self-
reliant in terms of resource mobilisation, is
financially viable having financed its expansion
from profits, and has substantially increased its
outreach to the poor as a market segment on com-
mercial terms. As it employs both the individual
and group technologies of providing financial
This article is drawn from the substantially larger
article 'Micro-finance in Indonesia: An Assessment of
Micro-finance Institutions Banking With the Poor'
published as an Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper
No. 2365 in January 1998 in the Rural Finance Program
of the Department of Agricultural Economics, The Ohio
State University, Ohio (USA).
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Box 1: Rural Micro-Finance Institutions in Indonesia
Rural MFIs in Indonesia are quite heterogeneous. They are classified into: BPR-Non-BKD, BPR-BKD and
LDKPs/SFIs (Lembaga Dana dan Kredit PedesaanlSmall Financial Institutions). The banking law of 1992
provides rules for the establishment of a fully licensed Rural Credit Bank (BPR) under Central Bank super-
vision and the transformation of LDKPs into BPR (BPR Non-BKD). The minimum paid-up capital for a
new BPR is Rp 50 million (US$ 22,500 at 1995 exchange rate). A new BPR cannot operate within the
provincial and district capital cities. lt is only allowed to operate within the sub-district where it is located
(though it appears that this rule is not rigidly enforced). The second type of BPR is BPR-BKD. BKD (Badan
Kredit Desa), is a village-based, hitherto semi-formal financial institution, established and owned by local
villages and supervised by BRI. The third type of BPR is called LDKP (Lembaga Dana dan Kredit Pedesaan)
or rural fund and credit institution, such as BKPD (Bank Karya Produksi Desa), LPK (Lembaga Perkreditan
Kecamatan), BKK (Badan Kredit Kecamatan), KURK (Kredit Usaha Rayat Kecil), LPD (Lembaga
Perkreditan Desa) and LKP (Lembaga Kredit Pedesaan), LPN (Lumbung Pitih Nagari). LDKPs were spon-
sored by provincial and local governments in the early 1970's as non-licensed rural credit institutions.
They were under provincial law and were usually supervised by the provincial development bank (BPD).
These LDKPs are now required to receive a BPR license within five years or close down.
Table 1: Formal and Semi-Formal Financial Institutions in Indonesia (December 1995)
Amount (Rp billion)
services, it also permits a comparative assessment of
the effectiveness of the two strategies.
Bank Shinta Daya's performance is evaluated on the
basis of four criteria: outreach to the poor (section
2), financial viability and sustainability (section 3),
ability to mobilise resources (section 4), and sound
micro-finance practices (section 5). Section 6 con-
tains a set of policy conclusions emerging from the
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case study, in particular, and the Indonesian micro-
finance sector, in general.
2 Outreach
Bank Shinta Daya was established with private
money and funded its expansion from profits, not
subsidies. During 1970-90, it indistinctively
mobilised savings from, and lent to, the non-poor
Type of financial
institution
Number Credit Funds mobilised Total financial
services
Accounts Amount Accounts Amount Accounts Amount
('000) (Rp bn.) ('000) (Rp bn.) ('000) (Rp bn.)
BPR (Rural Credit Bank)
and Secondary Banks
1,948 1,232 1,566 2,969 1,226 4,252 2,792
LDKPs (Small Financial 1,978 261 224 456 118 716 342
Institutions)
BKDs (Village Credit 5,435 955 93 1,176 63 2,130 156
Bodies, including BPR
ex-BKD)
Sub-total MFIs 9,271 2,448 1,883 4,601 1,447 7,098 3,290
BRI-UDES 3,482 2,264 3,194 14,483 6,016 16,747 9,210
Total 12,743 4,712 5,077 19,084 7,463 23,845 12,500
Commercial Banks 240 91,168 234,611 49,904 214,764 141,072 449,375
Sources: 1. Bank Indonesia Annual Report 1995/96, May 1996; 2. Indonesian Sta stical Report, March 1996; 3. Statistik Kredit
Koperasi dan Kredit Kecil KUK), January 1996; 4. Bank Rakyat Indonesia
Table 2: Savings Mobilisation and Credit Delivery through Individual and Group
Tchnologies in Bank Shinta Daya (as at December 1995)
Note: 'Figures in parentheses are percentages of the row total.
as well as the poor in its area of operation. Given
the relatively high transaction costs of collecting
micro-savings and small instalments on micro-
loans, the bank made no conscious effort of finan-
cial deepening among the poor. This began to
change in 1989 when Bank Shinta Daya started to
participate in the BIs project 'Linking Banks and
Self-Help Groups'. After an expensive and ulti-
mately abortive attempt at working through a local
NGO as a financial intermediary, Bank Shinta Daya
decided to seek out its own savings and credit
groups which are ubiquitous in Indonesia. The
bank set up a special group lending department,
hired its own field workers, some of them former
NGO staff, and trained its own groups of the poor
in group management, bookkeeping, savings
mobilisation and financial management. By
December 1995, the bank was effectively working
with 310 self-help groups (SHGs) comprising 7,750
members, Of these, 7,400 were active savers and
6,200 active borrowers of funds lent by the bank
wholesale to the SHGs (Table 2). At the same time
the bank had 22,940 individual depositors and
6,456 individual borrowers!
As evident from Table 2, the group technology has
enabled the bank to increase the number of savers
by about one-third. However, there is a wide differ-
ential between individual and group savers in ierms
of the amount deposited: of the total amount of say-
Savers and borrowers cannot be added up to arrive at
the total number of customers. The practice in many
small banks in indonesia is that opening a savings
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ing deposits 96.9 per cent have been mobilised
from individuals and only 3.1 per cent through
groups. The difference is due to savings techniques:
savings from individuals are voluntary; savings
through groups are compulsory regular and stan-
dardised at a minimal level that is affordable by
each member of a group.
The impact of the newly introduced group
approach is most dramatic with regard to access to
credit by the poor. By December 1995 the bank lent
to 2,582 poor borrowers individually The group
approach increased the number of poor borrowers
to 8,782, which is 69 per cent of all the bank's bor-
rowers. Without the group approach, the propor-
tion of poor borrowers would have been only 40
per cent. By comparison, the impact of the group
approach on access to deposit facilities among the
poor has been less pronounced: without the group
approach, the poor make up 80 per cent of the
bank's depositors. The group approach has
increased the share of the poor savers to 85 per
cent. All in all, 80 per cent of the accounts in the
bank are held by the poor. Without the group
approach, this percentage would have been 71 per
cent.
With regard to borrowers, the group technology has
enabled the bank to double its outreach: from 6,456
to 12,656 borrowers, but has added relatively little
account precedes a credit application, with the result
that the number of savers equals more or less the total
number of customers.
Technology
TotalIndividual Group
Number of depositers 22,940 (75.6)* 7,400 (24.4) 30,340 (100.0)
Number of borrowers 6,456 (51.0) 6,200 (49.0) 12,656 (100.0)
Number of poor depositers 18,352 (71.3) 7,400 (28.7) 25,752 (100.0)
Number of poor borrowers 2,582 (29.4) 6,200 (70.6) 8,782 (100.0)
Amount of deposit (in %)
All 96.9 3.1 100.0
- Poor only 89.9 10.1 100.0
Loans outstanding (in %)
All 89.3 10.7 100.0
- Poor only 48.4 51.6 100.0
to the volume of loans outstanding. Group mem-
bers represent 49 per cent of borrowers but only 11
per cent of the volume of loans outstanding.
Average loan sizes of individual borrowers are more
than twice that of group members, with the result
that the volume of loans outstanding from the poor
are in the hands of a much smaller number of indi-
vidual borrowers.
Bank Shinta Daya's experience suggests that:
private rural banks can and do provide financial
services to the poor
the non-poor are somewhat more likely than the
poor to be borrowers while the poor are far more
likely to utilise the bank's deposit facilities than
the non-poor
the group approach extends the outreach of the
bank to depositors including the poor by a
notable margin, but adds little to the overall vol-
ume of resources mobilised
while the bank's individual approach is savings-
driven, its group approach is not
in terms of additionality and financial deepen-
ing, the group approach is most successful in
providing access to credit for the poor
there may be an additional impact of bank
access on the volume of internal savings and
credit operations within the groups
the individual approach allows for larger average
loan sizes to the poor than the group approach -
a finding which requires further research. It is
not clear whether individual lending allows for
more differentiated loan screening while the
group approach suffers from an inherent regres-
sion to the mean.
There is a notable absence of financial institutions
or programmes of any significance specialised on
women in Indonesia. To varying degrees, women
are part of the market of any financial institution;
but most of them have no financial products differ-
entiated by sex, nor do they report sex-specific data.
While women have usually been found to be the
better savers and more reliable borrowers, they have
also tended to be the smaller savers and investors.
Few formal institutions, including formal and semi-
P41< (Proyek Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan
Petani Kecil - Income-generating Project for Small
Farmers) was first established in 1980-81 and restarted
in 1989-90. It is a large national poverty-lending
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formal MFIs, have focused on women only lt would
be unthinkable for a national bank like BRI or a pri-
vate rural bank like BPR Shinta Daya to focus
mainly on women. There is usually a scope of
widening, but not limiting, their outreach to
women. The group approach can be particularly
helpful in that respect. Informal financial institu-
tions like ROSCAs are almost a female monopoly in
Indonesia; upgrading them would greatly con-
tribute to financial deepening for women partici-
pants and indirectly contribute to their outreach - a
deepened outreach in this case. Special programmes
focusing solely on the poor like P4K3 have estab-
lished that a strong, though not necessarily exclu-
sive, focus on women will greatly contribute to the
viability of the programme and also be more effec-
tive in poverty alleviation in terms of donor invest-
ment. If this course is further pursued, it might
pave the way for transforming project operations
into large numbers of autonomous local MFIs
owned and run by women.
3 Financial Viability and
Sustainability
Only viable financial institutions with sustainable
financial services can increase their outreach. The
issue of viability is thus not only of relevance to the
health and survival of the institutions but also to the
poor themselves as clients and owners of such
institutions.
Bank Shinta Daya was established with private cap-
ital of US$ 40,000 in 1970, (equivalent to Rp 92.2
million in 1995) and financed its expansion from its
profits. Its net worth in December 1995 was Rp.
495.8 million (US$ 215,000), comprising Rp 179.5
million in capital and Rp 316.3 million in retained
earnings. Access to subsidised funds was not of any
vital importance to Bank Shinta Daya. In 1990,
when Bank Indonesia scrapped most of its sub-
sidised programmes and instead required commer-
cial banks to allocate at least 20 per cent of their
loan portfolio to small enterprises either directly or
through rural banks, Bank Shinta Daya took
advantage of this offer.
project of the Ministiy of Agriculture and BRI with
substantial financial assistance from IFAD and technical
assistance from UNDP
Table 3: Profitability of the Individual vs. Group Technology in Bank Shinta Daya
The bank employs two technologies: retail financial
services to individuals and wholesale services
through groups. As indicated in the previous sec-
tion, by adding the group technology the bank has
substantially increased its outreach in terms of
number of (end-) customers: group members repre-
sent 49 per cent of the banks direct and indirect
borrowers and 24 per cent of the bank's depositors
(see Table 2). In assessing financial viability, the cru-
cial issue to the bank is: How much does the group
technology add to the bank's business volume? And
how profitable are the two technologies to the
bank?
In terms of volume, group lending is of minor
importance to the bank: 89 per cent of the bank's
lending volume goes to individual borrowers and
only 11 per cent to group borrowers (Table 2).
Group deposits are almost negligible, representing
only 3 per cent of total savings deposits in the bank
compared to 97 per cent raised from individual
clients. For the Bank Shinta Daya both technologies
are profitable. But the individual technology is more
profitable than the group technology as 94 per cent
of the bank's profits are derived from its individual
lending and only 6 per cent from group lending.
The profit ratio of the individual technology is 2.6
of loans outstanding, the profit ratio of the group
technology only 1.4, as shown in Table 3.
The group technology is thus found to be viable as
such, but adds little to the bank's overall viability
Why then does the bank engage in business with
small groups? The bank's management explains
this with future expectations. By providing financial
services to group members with micro-enterprise
activities, it contributes to their growth. As the
members' micro-enterprises grow, so will their busi-
ness with the bank. Besides providing a service to
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the community which covers its costs and even
yields a profit, the bank hopes to grasp a larger mar-
ket share which might pay off substantially in the
future.
Thus, the BSD experience shows that viability and
sustainability can be attained in banking with the
poor and the near-poor. Technical assistance has
usually played a key role in the transformation of
subsidised programmes into savings-driven viable
institutions. Indonesia also shows that institutional
viability can be achieved even under repressive pol-
icy conditions (before 1983), provided the institu-
tions remain non-formal and apply their own sound
practices. Capacity-building through training that
may be provided by specialised bank training insti-
tutions, and by qualified NGOs, are a key input in
the transformation process.
4 Resource Mobilisation
Sustainability of micro-financial services hinges on
the mobilisation of internal resources, and the
soundness of financial practices in dealing with
these resources. Internal resource mobilisation
makes micro-finance institutions independent of
government and donor funding. It is the heart of
self-help. Major resources include share capital,
savings deposits and profits. For some micro-finan-
cial institutions operating in the micro-economy,
high interest rates on loans may be a very effective
instrument of internal resource mobilisation, in
addition to the collection of voluntary savings; this
is a form of self-imposed compulsory savings
mobilisation frequently chosen by small institutions
in the informal sector. Different types of saving
mechanisms that can be promoted for resource
mobilisation are summarised in Box 2.
Item Individual Group Total
Income (relative % share) 97.6 2.4 100.0
Expenditure (relative %
share)
98.0 2.0 100.0
Profit (relative % share) 94.0 6.0 100.0
Profit/loans outstanding 2.6 1.4 2.5
Profit/deposits 2.3 4.5 2.4
Profit/total financial services 1.2 1.1 1.2
Box 2: Saving Mechanisms for Resource Mobilisation
Savings products and innovations are major instruments in the hands of both formal and non-formal insti-
tutions to create their own deposit base. In small local micro-finance institutions, high interest rates on
loans may serve as a major mechanism of self-imposed compulsory savings mobilisation. The greatest
challenge for MFIs is to develop a range of savings products differentiated according to yield and matu-
rity. Banks, which frequently have access to easy money and cheap rediscounting facilities, need to develop
attractive savings products and cost-effective collection services that minimise both the bank's and the
savers' transaction costs (for example, daily, or some other form of regular, savings collection at doorsteps,
with transaction costs of this service either borne by the saver, as in most informal arrangements, or by
the deposit institution, as in most banks which offer this service). For the customers it is important that
institutions offer convenient deposit facilities for safeguarding their savings and provide a positive yield in
real terms lest their savings are eroded by inflation. Savings products differing in yield and maturity (such
as voluntary savings withdrawable at any time, or fixed deposits, or regular compulsory savings that are
non-withdrawable) provide incentives to find the right balance between the institutions' concern for long-
term deposits (as a basis of long-term loans) and the customers' liquidity preferences (in the form of sav-
ings withdrawable at any time): a particularly difficult task in inflationary economies. An additional
function of savings lies in the establishment of a track record, providing inexpensive information on the
creditworthiness of customers. Particularly in the case of the poor, a savings account provides easy access
to a bank, allows familiarisation with the bank and its corporate culture, and creates an opportunity for
building up liquid collateral for loans.
Resources can be mobilised under any policy
regime; but it is in an environment of deregulated
interest rates that resource mobilisation flourishes,
providing a source of self-financing to small farmers
and entrepreneurs and a basis of self-reliance to
financial institutions. By promoting, before deregu-
lation in 1983, autonomous semi-formal financial
institutions that did not fall under the banking law,
resource mobilisation as their main source of fund-
ing was effectively encouraged. As these institutions
found it difficult to collect voluntary savings with a
negative rate of return, their chief instrument of
fund mobilisation was a drastically increased inter-
est rate on credit - ensuring at the same time that
very scarce financial resources were allocated to
investments with the highest rates of return.
After the deregulation of interest rates in 1983 and
even more so after bank deregulation in 1988,
resource mobilisation skyrocketed in Indonesia.
The former event made it attractive for individuals
to save, the latter for institutions to expand their
collection network. The effect of deregulation has
been more pronounced on savings proper, an
instrument of the poorer sections of the population,
than on time deposits, an instrument of the non-
poor.
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All types of financial institutions now mobilise their
own resources in Indonesia, from national banks
like BRI to village banks, semi-formal MFIs and
informal SHGs, and, depending on the investment
climate, they do so in aggressive ways. Financial
innovations flourish in this climate, with numerous
new savings products emerging such as lottery sav-
ings and daily deposit collection at doorsteps. There
is wide scope for further stepping up resource
mobilisation by documenting and disseminating
information on such instruments. Institutions that
resist innovation and continue to stick to their pref-
erential savings and credit terms, like credit unions
until a few years ago, find their growth impeded. It
is only sound financial practices which strengthen
institutions and provide incentives that motivate
their owners and customers.
Convenient and safe savings deposit facilities are of
particular importance to the poor who have demon-
strated, time and again, a high propensity to save.
Savings products successfully used by Bank Shinta
Daya include voluntary individual passbook savings
and time deposits and compulsory group savings,
with interest rates ranging from 12 per cent on
passbook savings to 15-21 per cent per annum on
time deposits. Its savings deposits amount to 105
per cent of loans outstanding.4 But while the poor
account for 87 per cent of the bank's depositors,
their share of the total amount of deposits is only 38
per cent.
5 Sound Micro-Finance
Practices5
Sound micro-finance practices are essential for the
viability of MFIs and for a sustained increase in
their service outreach. This is of particular impor-
tance in banking with the poor, hitherto thought of
as unbankable. Successful MFIs with sustainable
micro-credit services in Indonesia have usually
invented a host of instruments and strategies which
differ from those used in banking with the urban or
rural non-poor. Viable and sustainable micro-credit
schemes require:
prudent adjustment to household savings,
investment and repayment capacities
small loan sizes, with ceilings growing over a
cycle of repeat loans up to a level determined by
the absorptive capacity of the micro-enterprise
and household economy
dynamically growing savings-to-credit ratios
market rates of interest autonomously deter-
mined by financial institutions and differentiated
according to costs and services provided
loan maturities and repayment modalities
according to customer needs and differentiated,
in case of wholesaling, according to each level of
intermediation
short maturities, no grace periods and short
instalment periods in case of initial loans
insistence on, and incentives for, timely repay-
ment
the development and provision of cost-effective
monitoring systems.
Micro-credit products6 are more appropriately dif-
ferentiated in terms of maturities, instalments, ser-
vices and collateral requirements (ranging from
joint liability and personal guarantees to tangible
collateral and pawning) than in terms of loan use,
In 1995, the bank had mobilised Rp. 5.05 billion in
savings and had Rp. 4.82 billion in outstanding loans.
The term 'best practices' owes its origin to the World
Bank and evokes the notion of optimal practices
applicable anywhere. In contrast, experience has shown
that sound practices vary by environment and must be
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which is costly to appraise and, for fungibility rea-
sons, difficult to control. Bank Shinta Daya has two
major categories of loan products: retail loans to
individual customers and wholesale loans to groups
which onlend to their members at terms deter-
mined by each group. The bank provides quick and
convenient access to small and often short-term
loans and bases subsequent lending decisions on
repayment performance. It accepts collateral substi-
tutes such as peer guarantees and, in the case of
group loans, peer pressure. Bank Shinta Daya
employs a fine-tuned loan pricing strategy which
takes into account customer category (groups, small
entrepreneurs or farmers, wage or salary earners)
and size of loan, collateral requirements, loan
period and spacing of instalments. Loan products
range from 3-6 months small loans up to Rp 5 mil-
lion - with weekly instalments at 30 per cent inter-
est per annum, directed mainly to the credit
demand of small traders, the majority of whom are
women - to 12-18 months loans above Rp 20 mil-
lion - with monthly instalments at 27.5 per cent
per annum, directed particularly to small entrepre-
neurs. For the convenience of the customers, instal-
ments are of a constant size throughout the
repayment period and monthly interest is charged
at a flat rate ranging from 1.7 per cent for the small-
est-size to 1.25 per cent for the largest size loans.
In this context, Bank Shinta Daya's sound micro-
finance practices include:
vigorous savings mobilisation through a range of
savings products with positive real returns,
including voluntary withdrawable passbook sav-
ings and time deposits
a variety of adequately priced loan products,
with different demand-led loan sizes and matu-
rities, as well as regular instalments
tight monitoring of loans and insistence on
timely repayment
risk management based mostly on adequate
lending terms and positive incentives including
the expection of repeat loans of growing size: in
conformity with the Javanese culture of face-
adjusted to a given situation. What is sound in one
situation may be unsound in another.
Credit products and techniques of appropriate credit
disbursement have been presented in the form of
training modules in Seibel (1992).
saving positive enforcements
operations within a confined local area where
both the bank and the customers are known to
each other
accountability to private owners who take a per-
sonal interest in the profitability of the bank
6 Policy Conclusions
The Indonesian experience shows that the estab-
lishment of MFIs and the outreach of existing finan-
cial institutions to the poor has been greatly
influenced by the deregulation of interest rates in
1983, which led to a surge in national resource
mobilisation and a multitude of financial innova-
tions, and bank deregulation in 1988, which led to
a rapid increase in the number of village banks and
the transformation of small institutions into rural
formal sector banks. Both have greatly eased access
of the poor to banking services and contributed to
the reduction of poverty in Indonesia.
For the further development of micro-finance insti-
tutions and micro-financial services for the poorer
segments of the population, four policy measures
are of particular importance:
Deregulation of interest rates (a) to permit insti-
tutions to pay interest rates with positive real
returns to savers and (b) to charge interest rates
on loans that cover their costs and permit prof-
its from which their expansion is financed and
owners are rewarded. This would allow a given
institution to differentiate its interest rates
depending upon loan product, loan size, matu-
rity and collection service. Bank Shinta Daya has
used the opportunities created by deregulation
in various ways, offering an average deposit rate
of 14.7 per cent and charging an average lending
rate of 27.4 per cent.
Bank deregulation to ease the establishment of
new banks, branching out, taking the bank to
the people, and to allow for the establishment of
local MFIs with equity capital requirements that
substantially differ from those for national
banks.
Provision of adequate forms of governance and
legal status for METs that may be owned by
Z Financial deepening refers to an increase in financial
services to a given area or market segment. In
discussing outreach, it is proposed to take a wider view
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members, communities and stockholders, as in
the case of Bank Shinta Daya. There is still a
need for adequate forms of non-bank status for
small and very small MFIs such as financial self-
help groups (i.e., the genuine micro-institutions)
Establishment of second-tier regulatory authori-
ties which guide and supervise large numbers of
small financial institutions that cannot be effec-
tively controlled by the central bank. This is still
largely a task of the future.
With 43,000 accounts and a clientele of over
30,000, comprising 30,340 savers and 12,656 bor-
rowers, Bank Shinta Daya has shown that privately
owned village banks can have a considerable out-
reach at the local level without being subsidised.
Moreover, as it records 69 per cent of its borrowers
and 85 per cent of its savers as poor, it has also
demonstrated that financial services to the poor by
private banks can be profitable and self-sustained.
The main emphasis of any further attempt at
poverty alleviation must concentrate on institution
building: the establishment and upgrading of insti-
tutions owned by the poor, and of institutions pro-
viding services for a clientele that includes the poor.
lt is clear that, on a national scale, no single
approach or single type of institution can achieve
this end. A systems approach to micro-finance is
needed which promotes access of all segments of
the population to financial services. In such an
endeavour development agencies may assist:
informal financial institutions to upgrade their
financial operations and acquire an appropriate
legal status, thus evolving into semi-financial
institutions with deepened services and
increased outreach
semi-formal financial institutions to upgrade
their financial operations and evolve, where fea-
sible, 4nto village banks (BPR)
informal, semi-formal and formal MFIs to link
up with banks as refinancing institutions, thus
strengthening their financial service capacity and
deepened outreach7
the poor to organise themselves in self-help
groups and to upgrade their activities and gain
access to the financial services of banks
and include both quantitative and qualitative outreach,
i.e. numbers and impact.
MFIs to open a window for targeting the poor
through the group approach, linking the MFI to
existing self-help groups
poverty alleviation projects in increasing
women's participation and in transforming their
local financial operations into autonomous local
MFIs owned and run by women
rural and commercial banks in establishing busi-
ness relations with MFIs to refinance their activ-
ities, thus strengthening their financial
deepening and outreach.
The terms and conditions of financial contracts
must be sound from both an institution's and its
customers' viewpoints. To arrive at balanced loan
contracts, an exchange of experience and mutual
learning may be required between the various types
of non-formal and formal institutions including: (i)
informal financial institutions with their wide range
of contractual terms concerning interest rates, loan
sizes, maturities, grace periods, loan purposes, rec-
iprocities, collateral requirements, services, transac-
tion cost sharing arrangements and unbounded
innovations; (ii) semi-formal financial institutions
including projects and programmes, which tend to
be influenced by governmental or non-governmen-
tal donors and may combine comprehensive non-
financial services with a lack of commercial
orientation; (iii) formal institutions on tightly regu-
lated markets, with a narrow and usually inflexible
range of contractual terms (or failing to utilise the
freedom granted by deregulation); and (iv) formal
institutions on deregulated markets with their
much wider range of terms, transaction cost sharing
arrangements and innovations. In Indonesia, this
learning process has been systematically promoted
by Bank Indonesia through its linkage banking pro-
ject, PHBK.
Ultimately savers and borrowers must be regarded
as a market for financial institutions: with the insti-
tutions as intermediaries and savers and borrowers
as customers rathér than beneficiaries. Contractual
terms and conditions on that market are the result
of negotiation and competition rather than admin-
istrative imposition and convenience. With
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increasing institutional diversification, there has
been mounting competition among institutions at
least in the more densely populated parts of
Indonesia. This is one of the best guarantees for bal-
anced loan contracts that do not ignore the interests
of the poor.
7 Coping with the Financial Crisis
- A Postscript
Field research on Bank Shinta Daya was done
before the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-
1997. There are no data yet to show how the bank
coped with the crisis. However, preliminary infor-
mation from Indonesia shows that MFIs, including
the village operations of BRI, have been least
affected. Apparently, politically instigated lending
has been a problem for big banks, not for small-
scale operations.
The free fall of the rupiah has greatly eroded the
value of both the MFI's equity capital and the cus-
tomers' savings deposits. Only effective supervision
of the whole banking system, including rigid
enforcement of compliance with sound banking
standards, can prevent the reoccurrence of such a
disaster in the future. This is of course a political,
not a banking, issue as it requires the political will
to prevent government interference, and the admin-
istrative ability to keep non-interference under
control.
Surprisingly, the financial crisis has not discouraged
saving behaviour as much as one might have
expected. In the case of BRI, the number of savers
has further increased, not declined, during the
twelve months since the outbreak of the crisis. This
might be due to the fact that, to prevent a total col-
lapse of the banking system, the government of
Indonesia has guaranteed the deposits in govern-
ment banks. This has led to an overall shift of
deposits from private banks, including METs, to
government banks, presumably further aggravating
the plight of the former. How Bank Shinta Daya has
been affected, and how it has coped, is an urgent
area for research.
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